Abstract-The problem of jamming plays an important role in ensuring the quality and security of wireless communications, especially at this moment when wireless networks are quickly becoming ubiquitous. Since jamming can be considered as a game in which jammer is playing against the user (transmitter) who would like to transmit signal with good quality and at the same time with a reasonable amount of energy, game theory is an appropriate tool for dealing with jamming. Here we investigate the effect of partially available information and correlation among sub-carriers on the user behavior. Specifically, to do so we deal with the scenario when the user does not know how jamming efforts are distributed among sub-carriers and the user does not know the fading channels' gains with certainty. As an object function for the user we consider SINR. We consider zerosum games, so all of them can also be viewed as a minimax problem for the user playing against the nature. We study independent fading channel gains scenario as well as dependent fading channel gains scenario, both in discrete and continuous versions. We show that in all the scenarii the jammers equalize the quality of the best sub-carriers for the transmitter on as low level as their power constraints allow. Meanwhile the transmitter distributes his power among these jamming sub-carriers. We find the equilibrium strategies in closed form and specify the range of sub-carriers where the transmitter can expect the jamming attack. Also, we show for independent plot these strategies depend only on the expected value of the transmitters channel gains meanwhile for the dependent plot they depend on the whole spectra of these gains. Thus, for independent plot the behaviour of the jammer is less fine tuned under environment since it works with the expected gains. The user for both scenarios has to take the whole spectra of the jamming gains but, of course, for the independent scenario he is less specific because of the jammer. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The problem ofjamming plays an important role in ensuring the quality and security of wireless communications, especially at this moment when wireless networks are quickly becoming ubiquitous. The recent literature covers a variety of jamming problems [1], [2] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [13] , [14] , [15] .
Since jamming can be considered as a game in which a jammer is playing against a user (transmitter) who would like to transmit signal with good quality and at the same time with a reasonable amount of energy, game theory is an appropriate tool for dealing with jamming. Here we investigate the effect of partially available information and correlation among subcarriers on the user behavior. Specifically, to do so we deal 1The work was partly supported by EGIDE ECO-NET grant no.18933 SL and RBRG no. 09-01-00334-a with the scenario when the user does not know how jamming efforts are distributed among sub-carriers and the user does not know the fading channels' gains with certainty.
As an object function for the transmitter we consider SINR. To the best of our knowledge, the SINR as an objective function in the power control game was only considered in [3] , [10] . In [10] all users have a single common channel and choose between several base stations. And in [3] the authors has considered the power control game between users, not between a user and a jammer. We note that in the regime of low SINR the present objective can serve as an approximation to the Shannon capacity. A central motivation to consider SINR as an objective function and not Shannon capacity, is that current technology for voice over wireless does not try to achieve Shannon capacity but rather uses given codecs that can adapt the transmission rate to the SINR; these tum out to adapt the rate in a way that is linear in the SINR over a wide range of throughput. The SINR has therefore been used very often to represent directly the throughput see [11] , [12] . The validity of this can be seen e.g. in [9, p. 151, 222, 239 ]. As we see from [9, Fig. 10 .4, p. 222], the ratio between the throughput and the SINR is close to a constant throughout long range of bit rates. For example, between 16Kbps and 256Kbps, the maximum variation around the median value is less than 20%.
We analyse jamming as a zero-sum game. Thus, it can also be viewed as a minimax problem for the user playing against the nature. We study independent fading channel gains scenario as well as dependent fading channel gains scenario, both in discrete and continuous versions. Independent and dependent channel gains scenarios can be considered as scenarios where transmitter has different information about environment. To demonstrate how this information impacts on the transmitter's behaviour we perform numerical modelling employing the obtained closed form solutions. Also, we show that in all the scenarii the jammers equalize the quality of the best sub-carriers for transmitter on as low level as their power constraints allow. Meanwhile the transmitter distributes his power among these jamming sub-carriers. We find the equilibrium strategies in a closed form and specify the range of sub-carriers where the transmitter can expect the jamming attack. Using this formulas we show for independent plot these strategies depend only on the expected value of the transmitters channel gains meanwhile for the dependent plot they depend
is the unique root of the following equation gains. The formulation and the analysis of the continuous models we will discuss in a separate section.
and v is the unique root of the equation where
III. OPTIMIZATION FORMULATIONS FOR THE DEPENDENT FADING CHANNEL GAIN SCENARIO
Let us consider the situation for the dependent fading channel gain scenario when one of the players is inactive. Thus, in this section we deal with the optimization problems. First we consider the case when the jammer is inactive, so his strategy J == (J1, ... , Jn ) is fixed and is known to the transmitter. Since (1) is linear in T, the optimal strategy for the transmitter for a fixed jammer strategy can be found as given in the next theorem.
Theorem 1: Let the jammer be an inactive player, so J is fixed. Then the optimal strategy for the transmitter is to transmit the signal within the sub-carriers with the maximal induced expected fading gains Lf=l Pkaf /(N Ok + (3fJ i ) .
(b) if
Theorem 2: Let the transmitter be an inactive player, so T == (T 1 , ... , Tn) is fixed. Then the worst payoff the transmitter could have is
where (Jf(v), . . . ,J~(v) is the optimal jamming strategy and
Next let us assume that the transmitter fixes his strategy, so, transmitter is an inactive player and he would like to know which payoff he can get under the most unfavorable circumstances, namely, the transmitter wants to find the minimum of We assume that the transmitter does not know the fading channels' gains with certainty, namely, the fading channel gains can be random, i.e. with probability p
VT(J)
The transmitter payoff is given as his average SINR:
We assume that players know that all the possible variations of fading channel gains af, (3f, the noise levels NO k and the probabilities pk. The total powers T and J are also known to both players. In the situation when the transmitter and the jammer are both active players, the payoff to the jammer is
-v(T, J).
That is, we consider a zero-sum game. We would like to emphasize that the formulation (1) allows one to study the correlation among different sub-carriers. Also we consider a particular important case when gains for both users are independent. In such a case the transmitter payoff is given as follows:
where pk is the probability that the fading channel gain {3i is in the state k (so, it is equal to (3f), and ql is the probability that the fading channel gain ai is in the state l (so, it is equal to a~) and NO is the background noise level in all the sub-carriers, which we assume to be constant. Besides these discrete models we will also study their continuous versions with the continuous distributions for the fading channels' on the whole spectra of these gains. Thus, for independent plot the behaviour of the jammer is less fine tuned under environment since it works with the expected gains. The user for both scenarios has to take the whole spectra of the jamming gains but, of course, for the independent scenario he is less specific because of the jammer. It is worth to mention that the considered jamming game relates to resource allocation games which have a lot of application with military favour (say, Colonel Blotto game [8] or Star War game [7] ) and in search theory [7] .
Proof Since Also,
then J, is the unique root of the equation
And, v == wT is the value of the game.
Proof Since the payoff (1) 
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
By (a) and (b), J i == 0 for T i == o. Since we deal with zerosum game it is reasonable to look for the jammer's optimal strategy among such strategies hampering only the sub-carriers employed by the transmitter, namely, T i == 0 for J, == O. Since Ri(x) is decreasing and continuous in x, it yields, by (10) , that the optimal J, has to be of the form (5), where w is the unique positive root of (6) . Then, it is clear that T;(w) given by (7) turns the system of the equations (8) It is interesting that the optimal jamming strategy assumes to (6) jam as much channels as possible with the best expected SINR meanwhile transmitter just adjusts to the situation making the best average harmed channels equally attractive for the where jammer.
V. A PARTICULAR CASE: THE FADING COEFFICIENT GAINS ARE KNOWN TO THE PLAYERS
We will assume that all the fading channel gains 0i and f3i' the noise levels NO, the total powers T and J are known to both players. Then the object function (payoff) to transmitter is as folows:
Since (11) is linear in T, the optimal strategy of the transmitter for a fixed jammer strategy (so, jammer is an unactive player) can be found as given in the next statement. and w is the unique root of the following water-filling equation:
And, v == o/T is the value of the game.
It is interesting that the optimal jamming strategy has water filling form which depends on the transmitter fading channel gains (Oi) and on the relation between the transmitter and jamming fading channel gains (Oi/ f3i) where the transmitter fading channel gains plays bigger role since it defines the sequence of the channels harmed by jammer. The level of the power the jammer has defines the number of the best channels he can harm. Transmitter just adjusts to the situation making the best harmed channel equally attractive for the jammer. Theorem 4: Let the jammer be an inactive player, so J is fixed. Then the the optimal strategy for the transmitter is to transmit the signal by the sub-carriers with the maximal induced fading gains 0i / (NO + f3i J i) .
VI. A PARTICULAR CASE: ZERO-SUM GAME FOR THE FADING CHANNEL GAINS INDEPENDENT WITH RESPECT TO THE OPPONENT
Let the transmitter be an inactive player (so, his strategy is fixed) and he would like to know which payoff he can get under the most unfavorable circumstances, namely transmitter wants to find the minimum ofvT(J) :== v(T, J) for a fixed T.
Then, the optimal strategy for the jammer has a water-filling form.
In the case of the fading channel gains independent with respect to the opponent the payoff (2) is equivalent to
k=l i=l 2 2 Theorem 5: Let the transmitter be an inactive player, so T is fixed. Then the worst payoff he could have is v == L~=l (oiTi/(NO + f3i Jf(w))), where Jf(w) is the optimal jamming strategy:
and w is the unique root of the water filling equatioñ
In the situation when the transmitter and the jammer are active players we have the following result supplying the equilibrium strategies in a closed form and specifying the range of sub-carriers where the transmitter can expect the attack of the jammer.
where O:i == Lf=l qlo~is the expected fading channel gain for the transmitter. Then we have the following result describing the equilibrium of the game. Table 1 the optimal strategies (T, J) for game-theoretical plot and J O for optimization plot and corresponding payoffs are given. For the game plot while the quality of the first sub-carriers (relation of GI / NO) is increasing the players more and more concentrate their efforts on this sub-carrier till they completely switch their efforts just for this sub-carrier. In the optimization approach the influence of this sub-carrier is increasing but not so big as in the game plot. The ratio of game and optimization payoffs increases from 1.31 for GI == 5 to 2.04 for GI == 20. Now consider the situation where the transmitter does not know the fading channel gains and we assume that the system consists from n == 5 sub-carriers and it can be in two states (K == 2) with background noise NO == (1,1). The transmitter and the jammer have the same power budgets, namely, let T == J == 3. The jammer fading and transmitter gains are given by ((1,5), (2,4)), (3, 3) , (4,2), (5, 1)) and ((20,1), (4, 2) , (3, 3) , (2, 4) , (1,5)), respectively. For the optimization scenario we assume that the transmitter applies the uniform strategy TO, so TO == (3/5,3/5,3/5,3/5,3/5).
Then, in Table 2 Table 1 . For pI == 0.2 in the game framework of the dependent plot the players still stick to the same strategies in spite of the fact that the value of the game goes down meanwhile for the the independent plot these strategies differ from each other. In the optimization framework the jammer tunes his behaviour more flexibly already for pI == 0.2 which allows him to bring bigger harm. With decreasing pI more and more sub-carriers become involved into strategies and from pI == 0.6 all the sub-carriers have to be taken into account by players. Figure 1 shows the dependence of the optimal payoff and the value of the game for both plots on pl. The value of the game for the independent case is always less than the optimization payoff and the value for the dependent one. Thus, we demonstrate that one can take advantage from the knowledge of the correlation structure. At two boundary points pI == 0 and pI == 1 the value of the games coincide, and the maximally differ at pI == 0.6.
For PI E [0.3,0.5] the optimization payoff for the uniform transmitter strategy is greater than the value of the game for the dependent case. In this paper we have studied how the available information and sub-carriers fading channel gains correlation impact the transmitter in the case of jamming. As an object function to the transmitter we have considered SINR. We have considered optimization and zero-sum game plots. The zero-sum game can also be viewed as a minimax problem for the user playing against the nature. We have studied independent fading channel gains scenario as well as dependent fading channel gains scenario. We have shown that in all the scenarii the jammers equalize the quality of the best sub-carriers for the transmitter on as low level as their power constraints allow, meanwhile the transmitter distributes his power among these jamming sub-carriers. We have found the equilibrium strategies in closed form and specified the range of sub-carriers where the transmitter can expect the jamming attack.
An interesting conclusion also can be done from comparing the closed form optimal strategies for the independent and dependent case. Namely, for independent plot these strategies depend only on ai, so they depend on the expected value of the transmitters channel gains meanwhile for the dependent plot they depend on the whole spectra of these gains. Thus, for independent plot the behaviour of the jammer is less fine tuned under environment since it works with the expected gains. The user for both scenarios has to take the whole spectra of the jamming gains but, of course, for the independent scenario he is less specific because of the jammer.
